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1 Introduction
Since the work of Aumann [1], the concept of correlated equilibrium (CE) has played an important
role in the study of games. Correlated equilibria always exist, and unlike Nash equilibria, which
are believed to be computational intractable (see [5]), a correlated equilibrium can be computed
efficiently in a broad class of succinctly-representable games [19]. In a correlated equilibrium, a
trusted correlating device selects strategies from a joint probability distribution and privately sends
a recommended move to each player. Each player maximizes his expected utility by following his
recommendation. The question of how to implement a correlated equilibrium without a trusted third
party has recently attracted the attention of the cryptographic community. For example, it has
been studied (see [6], [14], [15], [17], [20]) how to use cryptographic protocols to replace the trusted
mediator with multiple rounds of interaction between players.
In this paper, we study the scenario where, instead of having access to a mediator or the ability
to perform cryptographic protocols via rounds of communication, the players of a classical complete
information game initially share an entangled pure quantum state. Each player may perform arbitrary
local operations on his own qubits (by using the state as input to an arbitrary quantum circuit) in
order to determine which move to play, but no direct communication between players is allowed. An
appealing point of our model is that it has a simple theoretical implementation: assuming that players
have access to disjoint qubits from an appropriate quantum state, we do not need any interaction
between the players (in the form of a cryptographic protocol) or any communication with a trusted
mediator.
In our framework, we define the concept of quantum correlated equilibrium (QCE) for both normal
and extensive form games of complete information. We show that in a normal form game, any outcome
distribution implementable by a QCE can also be implemented by a classical CE. We prove that the
converse is surprisingly false: We give an example of an outcome distribution of a normal form game
which is implementable by a CE, yet we prove that in any attempted quantum protocol achieving
this distribution, at least one of the players will have incentive to deviate.
We extend our analysis to extensive form games, and find that the relation between classical
and quantum correlated equilibria becomes less clear. We compare the outcome distributions im-
plementable in our quantum model to those implementable by a classical extensive form correlated
equilibrium (EFCE) (see von Stengel and Forges [21]).1 For example, we show that there exists an
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1Since we are only concerned with games of complete information, we can avoid many of the technicalities from [8]
and [21].
extensive form complete information game and a distribution of outcomes which can be implemented
by a QCE but not by any EFCE, in contrast to the result for normal form games. We also consider
the concept of an immediate-revelation extensive form correlated equilibrium (IR-EFCE) (motivated
by discussion in Forges [7]) and compare the power of IR-EFCE to EFCE and to QCE.
1.1 Related Work
While work by Clauser et al [3], Cleve et al [4] and La Mura [16] have studied how quantum entangle-
ment can aid in games of incomplete information (such as Bayesian games), we restrict our attention
to games of complete information, and find that even in this framework the questions are nontrivial.
Quantum solutions of classical coordination games have been studied previously, such as in Cleve
et al [4] and Huberman et al [12]. In this paper, we look at games which have both cooperative
and competitive components. Instead of analyzing the “quantization” of games (see Meyer [18]), our
underlying games remain purely classical. Entanglement is used only as a device to aid in a player’s
decision of which strategy to play in the classical game. By keeping the underlying game classical,
our model generalizes naturally from normal form to extensive form games.
Since our goal is to study a mediator-free setting, it is necessary to restrict our model so that
the initial shared state be pure (See Appendix C). This restriction is very significant and differs
from work such as Zhang’s [22] which, while studying both pure and mixed initial states, limited
its mention of pure states to those with a certain restricted form.2 Furthermore, unlike La Mura’s
model [16], in our definition of equilibrium we do not restrict the local operations that a player might
potentially perform to his own qubits.
2 Classical Correlated Equilibria
We briefly discuss the concept of correlated equilibrium in classical complete information games, and
elaborate on this concept in Appendix A. For a more thorough discussion, see [1], [8], or [21].
2.1 Normal Form Games
Correlated equilibrium (CE) in normal form games was first introduced by Aumann [1]. In a cor-
related equilibrium of a normal form game, a trusted correlating device selects an outcome of the
game according to some known probability distribution, and privately suggests to each player the
appropriate action to achieve this outcome. The resulting play is a CE if each player can maxi-
mize his expected utility by always following his recommendation, given that all other players follow
their recommendations. See Appendix A for further discussion and an example, or see [1] for formal
definitions.
2.2 Extensive Form Games
We informally present the concept of classical correlated equilibrium in extensive form games of
complete (but imperfect) information, following [21]. A more thorough discussion can be found in [8]
and [21]. Note that there are several different ways of defining correlated equilibria in extensive form
games, and in this section we present two such versions.
An extensive form game G has a finite set of players, n. The game is represented as a rooted
directed tree, where the non-terminal nodes are partitioned into information sets. Each information
2Roughly speaking, the main difference is that we allow for pure states with many ancillary qubits, and these ancillary
qubits can indeed affect the players’ ability to gain utility by deviating.
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set belongs to a single player.3 A pure strategy for player i selects a single outgoing edge from every
information set belonging to i. Denote the set of pure strategies available to player i by Σi.
A correlating device µ is a distribution over
∏
i∈nΣi. Consider the following procedure:
• A trusted mediator draws a strategy profile pi = (pi1, pi2, . . . , pin) according to the correlating
device µ.
• The players begin playing the game G. As the gameplay enters each information set, the
mediator tells the set’s owner i the recommended move according to pii.
Following [21], we say that C = (G,µ) is an extensive form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) if, for
every player i, given that all other players follow their recommended move, player i’s expected utility
is maximized by always following his recommendation.4
In the above protocol, the strategy profile pi defines a suggested move at every information set.
This recommendation is revealed only to the set’s owner, and is only revealed when he reaches
the set. In addition to the definition from [21], we give an alternate definition of extensive form
correlated equilibrium (briefly mentioned in [7]), which we will call immediate-revelation extensive
form correlated equilibrium (IR-EFCE) defined analogously to that above except where player i learns
his entire strategy recommendation pii before gameplay begins. We compare the various classical
correlated equilibrium concepts in Appendix B.
3 Quantum Correlated Equilibria in Normal Form Games
In this section we discuss the concept of a quantum correlated equilibrium (QCE) in normal form
games.
Definition 1. Let G be a normal form game with n players. For each player i, let Ai be the set of
actions available to player i in G. Consider a 3-tuple (|ψ〉 ,Γ, Q) where
• |ψ〉 is pure quantum state.
• Γ is a partition of the qubits of |ψ〉 into n disjoint sets q1, q2, . . . , qn.
• Q = (Q1, . . . , Qn) is a collection of n quantum circuits, where circuit Qi takes as input the
qubits qi (as well as auxiliary |0〉 qubits) and outputs an action ai ∈ Ai.
Given such a 3-tuple, we denote D(|ψ〉 ,Γ, Q) as the distribution resulting over outcomes of G when
each player i applies Qi to his qubits of |ψ〉 and plays the result, and let ui(D) be the expected utility
for player i in the outcome distribution D.
We say that (|ψ〉 ,Γ, Q) is a quantum correlated equilibrium (QCE) if, for all players i and
for all quantum circuits Q′i
ui(D(|ψ〉 ,Γ, Q)) ≥ ui
(
D
(|ψ〉 ,Γ, (Q1, . . . , Qi−1, Q′i, Qi+1, . . . , Qn))) .
In a quantum correlated equilibrium, each player can maximize his expected utility by using his
prescribed quantum circuit on his qubits and playing the result, given that all other players follow
the output of their circuits. In our definition, |ψ〉 must be a pure quantum state. We believe that
restricting |ψ〉 to be pure is the natural definition for our purpose. In particular, since our goal is to
have a mediator-free setting, allowing for a mixed state would create a fundamental difficulty of how
3Throughout this paper we will assume that the game has the perfect recall property.
4We do not impose any requirement of subgame perfection in our equilibrium definition.
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to construct the initial state in a secure manner. See Appendix C for a detailed discussion of this
restriction.
It is a standard result from quantum computation that, given any quantum circuit Qi, there
exists an equivalent quantum circuit Q′i which performs all measurements at the very end of the
computation.5 Let (|ψ〉 ,Γ, Q) be a QCE of a normal form game. We can assume without loss of
generality that every quantum circuit (Q1, . . . , Qn) performs all of its measurements at the end of the
circuit’s computation. Consider the state |ψ′〉 which results immediately before any circuit performs
a measurement but after all unitary transformations have taken place. (By the “no-communication
theorem” of quantum mechanics, the final state does not depend on the particular order in which the
circuits act, since each circuit acts on separate qubits.) We can assume without loss of generality that
the action ai ∈ Ai output by Qi is obtained by measuring the first log2 |Ai| bits of player’s i partition
of |ψ′〉 in the standard basis (where we have a canonical mapping between log2 |Ai|-bit binary strings
and elements of Ai.)
Definition 2. Let G be a normal form game with n players. Let |ψ〉 be a pure quantum state, and let
Γ be a partition of the qubits of |ψ〉 into n sets q1, . . . , qn. For each player i, let Ai be the set of actions
available to player i in G, and fix some mapping between binary strings of length log2 |Ai| and elements
of Ai. Let Mi : qi → Ai be the circuit which measures the first log2 |Ai| qubits of qi in the standard
basis and outputs the resulting action in Ai (using the fixed mapping between strings and actions).
If (|ψ〉 ,Γ, (M1, . . . ,Mn)) is a QCE, we call (|ψ〉 ,Γ, (M1, . . . ,Mn)) a canonical implementation
QCE.
From the above discussion, we know that any QCE in a normal form game has an equivalent
canonical implementation, by letting |ψ′〉 be the quantum state which occurs immediately before any
measurements occur and after all unitary operations are performed.
Lemma 1. Let G be a normal form game, and let (|ψ〉 ,Γ, Q) be a QCE. Then there exists a canonical
implementation QCE (|ψ′〉 ,Γ′, (M1, . . . ,Mn)) such that
D(|ψ〉 ,Γ, Q) = D(∣∣ψ′〉 ,Γ′, (M1, . . . ,Mn)).
Since every QCE in a normal form game has an equivalent canonical implementation QCE, it
follows that any outcome distribution of a QCE in a normal form game can be achieved by a classical
correlated equilibrium of the same game. We will see later that the analogous result is false for
extensive form games.
Theorem 1. Let G be a normal form game, and let (|ψ〉 ,Γ, Q) be a quantum correlated equilibrium
of G. Then there exists a classical correlated equilibrium of G which induces the same outcome
distribution D(|ψ〉 ,Γ, Q).
Proof. By Lemma 1, there exists a canonical implementation QCE (|ψ′〉 ,Γ′, (M1, . . . ,Mn)) which
induces the output distribution D(|ψ〉 ,Γ, Q). Let P be the probability distribution on binary strings
resulting from measuring all of the qubits of |ψ′〉 in the standard basis, and consider the classical
correlating device which chooses a binary string according to P and tells each player the move sug-
gestion corresponding to the first log2 |Ai| bits of his partition of this binary string. If each player
indeed follows the advice, it obviously induces the outcome distribution D(|ψ〉 ,Γ, Q). Furthermore,
each player can maximize his utility by following his advice: If on the contrary player i could improve
his expected utility by not following his suggested move in this classical setting, then we could design
a quantum circuit Qi for i which improves his utility over ui(D(|ψ〉 ,Γ, Q)) by deviating in a similar
way, thereby violating the assumption that (|ψ〉 ,Γ, Q) is a QCE.
5This is sometimes known as the “principle of deferred measurement.”
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As a simple example of a QCE (similar to an example from [12]), consider the normal form
game in Figure 1. The outcome distribution 12(TR + BL) is achievable by a classical correlated
equilibrium. Furthermore, we can achieve this outcome distribution in a QCE by using the entangled
state 1√
2
(|0〉 |1〉 + |1〉 |0〉) in a canonical QCE representation. In this QCE, the first player measures
the first qubit of the pair to determine his move, and the other player measures the second qubit.6 It
is obvious that no player can improve his utility by using a different quantum circuit to manipulate his
qubit, since in this outcome distribution each player is always best-responding to the other player’s
action.
L R
T 0, 0 1, 5
B 5, 1 0, 0
Figure 1: The distribution 12(TR+BL) has a canonical QCE with state
1√
2
(|0〉 |1〉+ |1〉 |0〉).
We now ask whether the converse of Theorem 1 is true. Consider the game in Figure 2. It is easy
to check that 13(TR +BL+BR) is the outcome of a classical correlated equilibrium. To implement
this distribution, we might try having the players share the entangled state 1√
3
(|0〉 |1〉+ |1〉 |0〉+ |1〉 |1〉)
(where the first qubit belongs to the row player, and the second qubit belongs to the column player)
and instructing each player to measure his qubit in the standard basis to determine his action.
However, this is not a QCE. For example, the row player can apply a Hadamard transformation to
his qubit, resulting in the entangled state
2√
6
|01〉+ 1√
6
|00〉 − 1√
6
|10〉
before the measurements. Given that the column player indeed obeys the protocol and simply mea-
sures in the standard basis, the resulting outcome distribution is 23TR+
1
6TL+
1
6BL, which increases
the expected utility for the row player.7 Since the row player can use a Hadamard transformation
to increase his expected utility, the state 1√
3
(|01〉 + |10〉 + |11〉) does not form a canonical QCE
implementation of the outcome distribution 13 (TR+BL+BR).
L R
T 0, 0 6, 6
B 6, 6 0, 0
Figure 2: The CE outcome distribution 13 (TR+BL+BR) cannot be implemented by any QCE. See
Appendix D for a proof of this result.
While the obvious QCE implementation attempt failed, we could conceivably try to design a more
complicated QCE protocol achieving this outcome distribution.8 In the most technical result of this
6We assume a canonical mapping between binary values and moves in the game, where a measurement value of “0”
in the first qubit corresponds to the move “T”, etc.
7While in this example the column player’s utility also increases when the row player deviates, if we consider changing
the payoff of TL to be (0,−20), then the column player suffers significant losses when the row player deviates in this
proposed implementation.
8There are examples for which the “obvious” approach of achieving a desired distribution fails, but sharing a larger
quantum state achieves the distribution in QCE. For example, if we were to change the column player’s payoff to always
be 0 in the game from Figure 2, we could achieve the 1
3
(TR+BL+BR) outcome distribution by using an initial 3-qubit
shared state, where the last 2 qubits belong to the column player.
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paper, we prove that there is in fact no QCE achieving this outcome distribution, and thus classical
CE is a strictly more powerful concept than QCE in normal form games. The proof of this result is
in Appendix D.
Theorem 2. There exists a normal form game G and a classical correlated equilibrium distribution
of G such that the distribution cannot be achieved by any QCE.
4 QCE in Extensive Form Games
We define a quantum correlated equilibrium in perfect-recall extensive form games analogously to our
definition for normal form games. In a QCE, the qubits of a pure quantum state are partitioned and
given to the players of a game. A QCE consists of a quantum circuit for each information set. When
an information set is reached during the the game, the information set’s owner uses all qubits in his
possession9 as input to the appropriate circuit to determine his next action.10 In a QCE, no player
can improve his expected utility by changing any number of the circuits on his own information sets.
In our definition, the players share the entangled state |ψ〉 at the start of the game, and do
not gain access to any additional entangled qubits as play progresses. This framework is analogous
to a classical IR-EFCE. We believe that our definition is natural, since it avoids the necessity of a
mechanism to distribute new entangled states in later information sets.
We show in Appendix B that every IR-EFCE in an extensive form game G has a corresponding
classical CE in the normal form equivalent n(G). Furthermore, Theorem 1 states that every QCE
of n(G) has an equivalent classical CE in n(G). Nevertheless, it is possible that G has outcome
distributions which can be achieved by a QCE but which cannot be achieved by any classical IR-
EFCE (or EFCE).
The underlying reason why quantum correlated equilibrium can be more powerful in an extensive
form game G than in n(G) is the measurement principle of quantum mechanics. In particular, an
action in n(G) specifies a choice of action for every information set of G, even those information
sets which are not reached in the actual execution. To specify our actions in all of these information
sets for the game n(G), we would need to operate on |ψ〉 many times to determine what we would
hypothetically do in all of these unreached information sets. In the extensive form game, a player
only operates on |ψ〉 when his information set is actually reached.11
4.1 The Complete-Information GHZ Game
The analog of Theorem 1 is false for extensive form games. In particular, we have the following result.
Theorem 3. There exists a complete information extensive form game G and an outcome distribution
of the game which can be achieved by a QCE but not by any EFCE (or by any IR-EFCE).
We present a full proof of this theorem in Appendix E. The game that we use is a slight mod-
ification of the GHZ game from [9]. The GHZ game is a well-known example of a scenario where
players can achieve higher utility in a quantum setting than they can achieve classically. While the
GHZ game is a three-player game of incomplete information, we construct a “complete-information
GHZ game” (denoted cGHZ) by introducing a fourth player, who we incentivize to act as “nature.”
9Players have access to an arbitrarily large supply of ancillary |0〉 qubits.
10We now care not only about the action output by the circuit, but also about the resulting quantum state, since the
player will use this state in later information sets.
11Because the operations performed to |ψ〉 depend on the information sets visited during execution of the game, we
do not have a concept analogous to a “canonical implementation” of an extensive form QCE.
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An “always succeed” outcome distribution (where the original three players always receive maximum
payoff and the nature player receives minimum payoff) can be achieved in a QCE but not in any
EFCE or IR-EFCE.
By combining Theorem 1 and Theorem 3 we obtain the immediate corollary that extensive form
QCE is a more powerful concept than normal form QCE.
Corollary 1. There exists extensive-form game G and an outcome distribution of the game which
can be achieved by a QCE, yet no corresponding outcome distribution can be achieved by a QCE in
the normal form equivalent game n(G).
4.2 Limits of QCE in Extensive Form Games
While in some extensive form games QCE can be a more powerful solution concept than classical
EFCE, there are other games where outcome distributions can be achieved by EFCE but cannot be
implemented by any extensive form QCE. Consider the game in Figure 3. As discussed in Appendix B,
the outcome distribution 1/2(IN, a, L) + 1/2(IN, b,R) can be achieved by an EFCE but not by any
IR-EFCE. For a nearly identical reason, this distribution cannot be achieved by any extensive form
QCE.
INOUT
3, 3
1
ba
2
1
R
0, 0
L
100, 2
R
2, 100
L
0, 0
Figure 3: The outcome distribution 1/2(IN, a, L) + 1/2(IN, b,R) can be achieved by an EFCE but
not by any QCE (or by any IR-EFCE).
Suppose on the contrary that there were some QCE achieving the outcome distribution 1/2(IN, a, L)+
1/2(IN, b,R). Then we notice that, at the beginning of the game, player 1 could simulate the quan-
tum circuit for his second information set to compute whether, if he were to play IN, his next advice
would be a or b. If he computes that his next advice will be b, then he can improve his utility by
deviating and playing OUT.
The underlying reason why the outcome distribution discussed above cannot be implemented by
a QCE is that, in a QCE, a player has the ability to apply his circuits early, and can thereby compute
what his advice would be if he were to reach certain later information sets in the future. Since in this
example player 1 would have no further need of his qubits if he were to play OUT (since the game
would end immediately), there is no penalty for him to discover what his future advice will be. We
have therefore proven the following theorem:
Theorem 4. There exists an extensive form game G and an outcome distribution of the game which
can be achieved by an EFCE but not by any QCE or by any IR-EFCE.
While the above theorem states that in some games the EFCE concept can be more powerful than
both QCE and IR-EFCE, it also can be the case that some distributions can be implemented by both
an EFCE and by a QCE but not by any IR-EFCE. By combining aspects of the game from Figure 3
with complete-information GHZ game, we have the following result, which we prove in Appendix F.
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Theorem 5. There exists an extensive form game G and an outcome distribution of the game which
can be achieved by an EFCE and by a QCE but not by any IR-EFCE.
Finally, we note that the normal form game from Appendix D (viewed as a depth-2 imperfect
information extensive form game) provides an example of an outcome distribution that can be im-
plemented by EFCE and by IR-EFCE but not by any QCE.
Figure 4: Examples of outcome distributions implementable by QCE, EFCE, and IR-EFCE
5 Further Work
5.1 Perfect Quantum Implementation of Classical CE
A potential application of QCE is to use quantum entanglement (and no classical communication) to
remove the need for a trusted mediator when implementing a classical correlated equilibrium. While
this might not always be possible (since some CE distributions might not have a corresponding QCE-
see Appendix D), we have shown that for many classical CE distributions there indeed exists a QCE
which induces the same distribution.
We now ask more precisely what it means for a mechanism to “implement” a classical CE. If we
were to follow the viewpoint of Dodis, Halevi and Rabin [6], it would suffice to show that our mecha-
nism has an equilibrium which is equivalent to the distribution of the desired correlated equilibrium.
The framework of [6] matches closely with the analysis we have already performed, since we studied
which correlated equilibria have a corresponding QCE with the same outcome distribution.
We can also take a more restrictive view of what it means for a mechanism to “implement” a
desired correlated equilibrium, in a manner analogous to Izmalkov, Lepinski and Micali [14], [15].
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Izmalkov, Lepinski, and Micali defined the concept of “perfect implementation” of a mechanism.
Roughly speaking, a perfect implementation preserves not only a single desired equilibrium, but it
must preserve all of the strategic properties of the game as well as the privacy of the players. We do
not wish to formally define perfect quantum implementation at this time, but we will give a rough
outline of some of the properties it should obey.
For simplicity, we will only look at normal-form classical games, and we will continue to view the
underlying game as a “black box” (avoiding the implementation issues from [14]). Let D be a classical
CE distribution of the game G, and let A be the trusted classical mediator which suggests actions to
the players according to D. We denote GA to be the classical game where each player receives advice
from A before deciding on his action. While we do not wish to formalize the notion at this point, we
draw motivation from [15], and impose the requirement that, in order for (|ψ〉 ,Γ, Q˜) to be a perfect
quantum implementation of D, we must at the very least satisfy
• (|ψ〉 ,Γ, Q˜) is a QCE with outcome distribution D.
• For each player i there is a mapping fi from quantum circuits Qi to strategies in GA such that, if
(|ψ〉 ,Γ, (Q1, . . . , Qn)) is a QCE with distributionD′, then the set of strategies (f1(Q1), . . . , fn(Qn))
is an equilibrium of GA with outcome distribution D′.
We should also enhance our definition to require that (if the game has more than two players)
properties such as collusion-resilience of GA are preserved in our perfect quantum implementation.
For example, if two players in (|ψ〉 ,Γ, Q˜) could collude (perhaps by performing a quantum operation
which acts on both of their qubits) then a similar collusion should be possible in GA.
The main idea is that a perfect quantum implementation not only achieves D in QCE, but does
not introduce any additional equilibria which would not already exist if the players were given the
classical mediator A.12
Achieving a perfect quantum implementation of a classical CE seems to be a much loftier goal
than matching a single desired distribution in equilibrium, and we suspect that in most cases will be
impossible. While in some very simple examples we are able to achieve such a perfect implementation,
it remains a further question to study to what extent we can achieve a perfect (or some reasonably-
defined approximation of perfect) quantum implementation of a classical CE.
5.2 Other Open Questions
1. What is the computational complexity of computing a QCE in a normal form game? In an
extensive form game?
2. Given an outcome distribution of a classical game which can be achieved by a QCE, is there
an efficient method of computing the smallest number of entangled qubits that must be shared
in order to achieve this outcome distribution in QCE? If the game is a normal form game, is
there an efficient method of determining the smallest number of qubits needed in a shared state
which achieves the outcome distribution in a canonical implementation QCE?
3. In our model for QCE, the players are allowed to initially share an arbitrary pure quantum
state. Which QCE outcome distributions are possible if we only allow the players to initially
share an arbitrary number of EPR pairs?13
12Since we do not introduce any communication between players in our quantum setting, we do not have to deal with
issues of “aborting” computations as in [14] and [15].
13Using EPR pairs, it is possible for two players to construct an arbitrary shared entangled state using only local
operations and classical communication. (See [2].) However, this approach is unsatisfactory in our framework for a two-
9
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A Normal Form Correlated Equilibrium
In a Nash equilibrium of a normal form game, each player selects a probability distribution over his
possible moves, and the resulting distribution on outcomes is the resulting product distribution. In
a correlated equilibrium, however, a correlating device is used to correlate the random choices made
by each player, therefore allowing for a wider variety of outcome distributions.
We consider a canonical representation of correlated equilibria, in which a correlating device
suggests a single move to each player. (In a more general framework, the correlating device can
provide arbitrary signals, although these two models are equivalent.) The resulting play is a CE if it
is optimal for each player to always follow his advice, given that all other players follow their advice.
For example, consider the game in Figure 5. We claim that there exists a CE having outcome
distribution 13(TR+BL+BR). Imagine the correlating device taking three envelopes with contents
TR, BL, and BR, choosing an envelope at random, and secretly telling each player his recommended
move. For this to be a correlated equilibrium, we must show that each player maximizes his expected
utility by always following his advice, given that his opponents always follow their advice. For
example, suppose that the column player always follows his advice. If the row player receives advice
T , then he knows that the column player must have received advice R, and therefore the row player
maximizes his utility by following his suggestion and playing T . If the row player instead receives
advice B, then he knows that, conditional on his advice, his opponent will be playing L half the time
and R half the time. His expected utility of playing T is therefore 3.5, while his expected utility of B
is 5. Therefore the row player maximizes his expected utility by playing B. An analogous argument
shows that, if the row player always follows his advice, then it is optimal for the column player to
follow his advice as well.
Notice that the presence of a trusted correlated device is vital to achieve the equilibrium dis-
tribution 13 (TR + BL + BR) in Figure 5. In particular, we cannot achieve this distribution using
only a public random string. The underlying reason is that each player must not be able to know
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L R
T 0, 0 7, 10
B 10, 7 0, 0
Figure 5: The outcome distribution 13(TR + BL + BR) can be achieved by a classical correlated
equilbrium.
the opponent’s advice. If, for example, the row player received advice B and could compute with
certainty whether the column player had received advice L or R, then he could increase his expected
utility by playing T whenever the column player received R.
B Comparison of Classical Correlated Equilibria
We state a few results concerning the power of various classical correlated equilibrium concepts. The
arguments given below are informal. When we compare equilibrium concepts, we are concerned
primarily with the induced outcome distribution reached in each equilibrium.14
Claim 1. In any extensive form game, any IR-EFCE has an equivalent EFCE. However, it is not
necessarily the case that every EFCE has an equivalent IR-EFCE.
Proof. We argue informally that the above claim is true by noting that at any information set in
an IR-EFCE, every player knows at least as much as he would know in the corresponding EFCE,
and he also knows additional information about the advice he will receive at later information sets.
Therefore, if it is never in the player’s interest to deviate even if he knows all of the information from
the IR-EFCE, it will clearly be impossible for him to increase his expected utility by deviating if he
knows even less about the future.
For the reverse direction of the claim, consider the game in Figure 3. It is easy to check that
the outcome distribution 1/2(IN, a, L) + 1/2(IN, b,R) is achievable by an EFCE. However, there is
no IR-EFCE achieving this distribution. The reason is that, in the IR-EFCE framework, if player 1
receives advice IN , he can check immediately whether his advice for his second move will be L or
R. If his advice will be R, he can improve his utility by deviating and playing OUT . Notice the
EFCE framework, the player does not know if his advice will be L or R until after he plays IN , and
therefore he simply computes that his expected utility of playing IN is 51 which is greater than the
utility of 3 he receives by playing OUT .
For any extensive form game G, there is a corresponding normal form game, which we will denote
n(G) and call the normal form equivalent of G. The players of n(G) are the same as the players of
G, and a pure strategy of player i in n(G) corresponds to a choice of a single move from all of i’s
information sets in G. (Note that the size of the game matrix for n(G) might be exponentially larger
than the size of the game tree representation of G.) We define the payoffs of n(G) according to the
corresponding outcome of G. We say that an outcome distribution D of G corresponds to an outcome
distribution D′ of n(G) if the probability of any outcome x of G under D is equal to the sum of
the probabilities of all corresponding outcomes x1, x2, . . . of n(G) under D. (Notice that x may have
several corresponding outcomes in n(G), since many moves in n(G) can differ only on information
sets which are never reached in the path to x in G’s game tree.) We say that equilibria of G and
n(G) are equivalent if their induced outcome distributions are equivalent.
14Thus, an informal statement such as “an IR-EFCE has an equivalent EFCE” should be interpreted as meaning that
there is an EFCE having the same induced outcome distribution as the IR-EFCE.
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Claim 2. Let G be an extensive form game. Then every IR-EFCE of G has an equivalent correlated
equilibrium of n(G). Furthermore, every correlated equilibrium of n(G) has an equivalent IR-EFCE
of G.
The proof of Claim 2 follows easily from the definition of n(G).
C Pure States in Quantum Correlated Equilibria
In our definition of QCE, the players initially share a pure quantum state |ψ〉. We do not allow for the
players to initially share a mixed state (which would make the converse of Theorem 1 obviously true),
since the use of mixed states hides information and affects properties such as collusion-resiliance.
For example, suppose that, in order to implement the distribution 13(TR + BL + BR) in Figure 6,
we allowed the players to share the mixed state ρ which was |01〉 with probability 1/3, |10〉 with
probability 1/3, and |11〉 with probability 1/3. The access to such a mixed state obviously allows
the players to achieve the desired outcome distribution (by measuring in the standard basis), and it
is furthermore obvious that no player can improve his utility by deviating. (Since our mixed state
has only classical uncertainty of which state the players share, the players cannot take advantage of
quantum interference effects.)
The difficulty comes when we ask how we obtained the mixed state ρ. One method is to begin
with the state
|ψ〉 = 1√
3
(|0〉 |1〉 |00〉 + |1〉 |0〉 |01〉 + |1〉 |1〉 |10〉)
and to give the first qubit from |ψ〉 to player 1 and the second qubit to player 2. The complication
is what we do with the remaining two qubits. If we were to give these qubits to either player 1 or
player 2, the player could measure the qubits to deduce the other player’s advice, and therefore has
the opportunity to deviate and improve his utility. An implementation which relied on the mixed
state ρ would therefore be undesirable in that, if either player managed to get access to the missing
two qubits of the purification, he might be able to improve his utility by deviating.
One way to solve this problem is to introduce a third player to the game, to give this player only
a single possible action O in G, and to give him utility 0 in all outcomes of the game. Classically,
this three-player game inherits much of the equilibrium structure of the original game, since the third
player has no choice in his action. Furthermore, we can indeed achieve the outcome distribution
1
3(TRO +BLO +BRO) by a QCE in this three-player game by using the state |ψ〉 from above and
giving the last two qubits to the third player.15
From a mechanism-design point of view, however, this QCE in the three-player game is very
different from the classical CE implementation in the two-player game. In particular, the addition of
the third player makes the three-player quantum implementation vulnerable to collusion (since either
player 1 or player 2 could improve his utility by colluding with player 3) while the two-player classical
implementation does not have this vulnerability. Since we do not want to introduce unnecessary
collusive vulnerabilities into our implementation, we find this construction of adding an additional
player to the game unsatisfactory. Indeed, our main motivation for introducing QCE was to avoid
the necessity of a trusted third party, and allowing for mixed states reintroduces this difficulty.
The underlying difficulty of using mixed states is that, in their construction, information leaks
outside of the system. If a player were to gain access to this information, then he might use this
knowledge to improve his utility. It is therefore difficult to imagine a method of constructing an
15This construction works in general- given any classical CE outcome distribution of a normal form game G, we can
construct a game G′ which has one additional player (where this new player only has a single action, and receives utility
0 regardless of the outcome) such that we can implement the corresponding outcome distribution in G′ by a QCE.
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initial shared mixed state without use of a third party. By using only pure states, we can avoid much
of the difficulty in preparing the initial state.
D Normal Form CE with no Quantum Equivalent
In this Appendix, we study a particular CE in a normal form game and prove that no QCE achieves
this outcome distribution. The game we analyze is as follows:
L R
T 0, 0 6, 6
B 6, 6 0, 0
Figure 6: The CE distribution 13 (TR+BL+BR) cannot be achieved in a QCE.
This game has a classical correlated equilibrium 13(TR + BL + BR) with expected utility 4 for
each player. As shown earlier, this outcome distribution is not implemented in canonical QCE by the
shared state 1√
3
(|01〉+ |10〉+ |11〉), since either player can measure in the Hadamard basis to improve
his utility.
In this Appendix, we prove that it is impossible to use a more complicated shared state to obtain
a canonical QCE implementation of the desired distribution.16 In Appendix D.1, to introduce of our
analysis technique, we present an incorrect implementation attempt, and prove that one player has
incentive to deviate from his prescribed protocol. In Appendix D.2 we generalize this analysis, result-
ing in a set of conditions that any shared state implementing the outcome distribution in a canonical
QCE must satisfy. Finally, in Appendix D.3, we prove that no state satisfies these conditions.
D.1 Example Analysis of Failed Implementation Attempt
To give intuition for our analysis approach, we present a failed attempt at achieving the desired
outcome distribution in a canonical QCE. Consider having the players share the state
|ψ〉 = 1√
6
|00〉 |10〉 − 1√
6
|00〉 |11〉+ 1√
6
|10〉 |00〉 + 1√
6
|11〉 |00〉+ 1√
12
|10〉 |10〉
+
1√
12
|10〉 |11〉+ 1√
12
|11〉 |10〉+ 1√
12
|11〉 |11〉
where the first two qubits belong to the row player and the last two qubits belong to the column
player. A player is instructed to measure his qubits in the standard basis, and to play the action
according to his first qubit. (Thus, if the row player measures a |0〉 in the first register, he should
play T , etc.)
Suppose that player 2 (the column player) follows his prescribed protocol. Player 1 (the row
player) is now facing the following scenario:
Probability P2’s state P1’s state u(T ) u(B)
1/3 |00〉 1√
2
|10〉 + 1√
2
|11〉 0 6
1/3 |10〉 1√
2
|00〉 + 12 |10〉 + 12 |11〉 6 0
1/3 |11〉 − 1√
2
|00〉+ 12 |10〉+ 12 |11〉 6 0
16Recall that if this distribution can be implemented by a QCE, then it has a canonical QCE implementation, so it
suffices to prove that there is no canonical QCE.
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We now write |1+〉 = 1√
2
(|10〉+ |11〉). With this notation, the row player’s situation is as follows:
Probability P1’s state u(T ) u(B)
1/3 |1+〉 0 6
1/3 1√
2
|1+〉+ 1√
2
|00〉 6 0
1/3 1√
2
|1+〉 − 1√
2
|00〉 6 0
Since |1+〉 and |00〉 are orthogonal, we observe that player 1’s performance of any strategy for the
above scenario would perform identically to using that strategy in the scenario:
Probability P1’s state u(T ) u(B)
1/3 |1+〉 0 6
1/3 |1+〉 6 0
1/3 |00〉 6 0
The above scenario is simply a classical probabilistic mixture of the orthogonal advice states |1+〉
or |00〉. Therefore, player 1 can do no better than playing B when given |1+〉 and playing T when
given |00〉, for an expected utility of 4. This is the expected utility of following the QCE protocol,
and therefore player 1 cannot gain any utility by deviating.
Unfortunately, the state |ψ〉 does not yield a canonical QCE. The reason is that the column player
can improve his utility by deviating. By performing similar analysis to that above, we see that the
column player is facing the following scenario:
Probability P1’s state P2’s state u(L) u(R)
1/3 |00〉 1√
2
|10〉 − 1√
2
|11〉 0 6
1/3 |10〉 1√
2
|00〉 + 12 |10〉 + 12 |11〉 6 0
1/3 |11〉 1√
2
|00〉 + 12 |10〉 + 12 |11〉 6 0
We observe that the states 1√
2
|10〉 − 1√
2
|11〉 and 1√
2
|00〉+ 12 |10〉+ 12 |11〉 are orthogonal. Therefore,
the column player can distinguish the first case from the bottom two cases with certainty, and can
therefore achieve expected utility 13 (6 + 6 + 6) = 6. Thus, he has incentive to deviate from his
prescribed protocol.
D.2 Density Matrix Constraints
In this section, we generalize the analysis from Appendix D.1 to study the properties of any state |ψ〉
which implements the outcome distribution 13(TR+BL+BR) in a canonical QCE. We will prove in
Appendix D.3 that no such state |ψ〉 exists.
We first look at the mixed state of the row player conditional on the column player’s advice.
Conditional on the column player having first qubit |0〉, we call the density matrix of the row player’s
qubits ρ, and conditional on the column player’s first qubit being |1〉, we call the row player’s density
matrix σ.
We know that when the column player has first qubit |0〉, the first qubit of the row player’s state
must be |1〉 (since TL is never played in the equilibrium), while when the column player has first qubit
|1〉, the row player must have equal probability of measuring |0〉 or |1〉 in his first qubit. Therefore,
we can write
ρ =
[
0 0
0 ρ˜
]
; σ =
[
σ1 σ2
σ†2 σ3
]
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where the first half of the diagonal entries (those which lie in the top-left quadrant) correspond to the
row player’s first qubit being |0〉 and the second half of the diagonal entries (those in the bottom-right
quadrant) correspond to the row player’s first qubit being |1〉. Since |ψ〉 implements the distribution
1
3(TR+BL+BR) in canonical QCE, we have Tr(ρ˜) = 1 and Tr(σ1) = Tr(σ3) = 1/2.
The goal of this section is to prove the following lemma:
Lemma 2. If |ψ〉 yields a canonical QCE implementation, then σ2 is the zero matrix and σ3 = 12 ρ˜.
Intuitively, the row player maximizes his utility by trying to determine if he’s been given σ instead
of ρ. We have the following definition:
Definition. Let Q be a quantum circuit which takes as input a mixed state and outputs either 0 or
1. We define the completeness of Q, denoted c(Q), to be
c(Q) = Pr[Q(σ) = 1]
and the soundness of Q, denoted s(Q), to be
s(Q) = Pr[Q(ρ) = 1].
Notice that by measuring the first qubit and outputting 1 if this qubit is |0〉, the row player has
a simple test which has completeness 1/2 and soundness 0.
Claim 3. The row player has incentive to deviate from his QCE protocol if and only if there exists a
quantum circuit Q such that
c(Q) >
1
2
+
1
2
s(Q).
Proof. Suppose we have such a circuit Q. Consider the protocol for the row player where he runs Q
on his state, and plays T if and only if Q outputs 1. The row player’s expected utility of this strategy
is
1
3
(6 ∗ Pr[Q(ρ) = 0]) + 2
3
(6 ∗ Pr[Q(σ) = 1])
= 2(1− s(Q)) + 4c(Q) = 2 + 2(2c(Q) − s(Q))
> 2 + 2(1− s(Q) + s(Q)) = 4
and therefore this strategy gives the row player expected utility above 4. Since his expected utility
in 13(TR+BL+BR) is 4, the row player has incentive to deviate.
To show the other direction, suppose that the row player had some circuit Q′ which took his qubits
as input and output either T or B, such that his utility of playing this strategy was strictly greater
than 5. Construct the quantum circuit Q which simulates Q′ and outputs 1 whenever Q′ outputs T .
We now compute
E[urow(Q
′)] =
1
3
(6 ∗ Pr[Q′(ρ) = B]) + 2
3
(6 ∗ Pr[Q′(σ) = T ])
=
1
3
(6 ∗ Pr[Q(ρ) = 0]) + 2
3
(6 ∗ Pr[Q(σ) = 1])
= 2(1 − s(Q)) + 4c(Q) > 4
and thus
4c(Q) − 2s(Q) > 2
so c(Q) > 12 +
s(Q)
2 , as desired.
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As an example application of this claim, we notice that in the attempted QCE implementation
1√
3
(|01〉+ |10〉 + |11〉),
the row player’s task is to distinguish between the state |1〉 (corresponding to ρ) and 1√
2
(|0〉 +
|1〉) (corresponding to σ). By measuring in the |+〉 , |−〉 basis and outputting 1 if and only if the
measurement returns |+〉, we have a test with completeness 1 and soundness 1/2. Since 1 > .5 + .25,
the row player can indeed improve his utility by deviating.
We now suppose that |ψ〉 indeed implements a QCE, and we will look at the states
ρ =
[
0 0
0 ρ˜
]
; σ =
[
σ1 σ2
σ†2 σ3
]
in detail, by applying Claim 3. We first claim that σ3 =
1
2 ρ˜. In particular, if σ3 6= 12 ρ˜, then we could
perform the following test Q:
• Measure the first qubit in the standard basis. If this qubit is |0〉, output 1 and halt. If this
qubit is |1〉, continue.
• Since 2σ3 6= ρ˜, there exists a quantum circuit Q′ acting on the remaining qubits such that
P [Q′(2σ3) = 1] > P [Q′(ρ˜) = 1].
Simulate this circuit on the remaining qubits, and output the result.
We notice that if the input state were σ and the result of measuring the first qubit was 1, then the
resulting state (ignoring the first qubit) would indeed be 2σ3, Therefore, the test Q has
c(Q) =
1
2
+
1
2
Pr[Q′(2σ3 = 1)]
s(Q) = Pr[Q′(ρ˜) = 1]
and hence c(Q) > 12 +
s(Q)
2 . By Claim 3, the row player has incentive to deviate.
Our next goal is to show that σ2 must be the 0 matrix. To do this, we consider the experiment
where we are given mixed state σ with probability η1 = 2/3 and state ρ with probability η2 = 1/3.
We have a quantum measurement circuit Q which is supposed to output 1 when given σ and 0 when
given ρ. We define the error probability of Q to be
PE(Q) = η1P [Q(σ) = 0] + η2P [Q(ρ) = 1]
PE(Q) =
2
3
(1− c(Q)) + 1
3
s(Q) =
2
3
− 2
3
c(Q) +
1
3
s(Q)
PE(Q) =
1
3
+
2
3
(
s(Q)
2
+
1
2
− c(Q)
)
We define the minimum error probability to be
PminE = min
Q
PE(Q) =
1
3
− 2
3
max
Q
(
c(Q)− s(Q)
2
− 1
2
)
.
We now use a result of Helstrom [10], as mentioned in [11], which states that
PminE =
1
2
(1− Tr|η2ρ− η1σ|),
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where |τ | =
√
τ †τ . (Thus, the trace of |τ | is the sum of the singular values of τ .) By applying Claim 3,
we know that the row player has incentive to deviate if and only if
1
2
(1− Tr|1
3
ρ− 2
3
σ|) < 1
3
,
or, equivalently, if
Tr|1
3
ρ− 2
3
σ| > 1
3
.
We now notice that
Tr|1
3
ρ− 2
3
σ| = Tr|2
3
σ − 1
3
ρ| = Tr
∣∣∣∣
[ 2
3σ1
2
3σ2
2
3σ
†
2 0
]∣∣∣∣
Therefore, the row player has incentive to deviate if an only if
Tr
∣∣∣∣
[
σ1 σ2
σ†2 0
]∣∣∣∣ > 12 .
Since the trace of the absolute value of a matrix equals the sum of its singular values, we can write
the above condition as ∑
i
∣∣∣∣λi
([
σ1 σ2
σ†2 0
])∣∣∣∣ > 12 .
Since we know that ∑
i
λi
([
σ1 σ2
σ†2 0
])
= Tr(σ1) =
1
2
,
the row player has incentive to deviate if and only if the matrix M =
[
σ1 σ2
σ†2 0
]
has a negative
eigenvalue. We claim that this occurs if and only if σ2 is non-zero.
If σ2 = 0, then clearly the nonzero eigenvalues of M are equal to the nonzero eigenvalues of σ1 (a
positive semi-definite matrix). Therefore, if σ2 = 0, the row player has no incentive to deviate.
Suppose now that σ2 is non-zero. Then there exists some index (i, j) into the top-right block of
M such that M(i,j) is non-zero. It follows from our indexing that (i, i) is an index into the top-left
block of M , (j, i) is an index into the bottom-left block, and (j, j) is an index into the bottom-right
block.
To show that M has a negative eigenvalue, we will show that M is not positive semi-definite.
Consider the 2× 2 principal minor of M given by the matrix
A =
[
M(i,i) M(i,j)
M(j,i) M(j,j)
]
.
We now compute
det(A) =M(i,i)M(j,j) −M(i,j)M(j,i) =M(i,i) · 0−M(i,j) ·M∗(i,j) < 0.
Since A has a principal minor with negative determinant, we conclude that M has a negative eigen-
value, as desired.
In summary, we have shown that the row player has incentive to deviate unless
σ =
[
σ1 0
0 12 ρ˜
]
.
We can derive analogous constraints on the density matrices by looking at when the column player
has incentive to deviate.
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D.3 Impossibility of Satisfying Density Constraints
Suppose that quantum state |ψ〉 is a canonical QCE implementation of the desired outcome distribu-
tion. We write
|ψ〉 =
∑
x∈{0,1}n−1
y∈{0,1}m−1
axy |0x〉 |1y〉+
∑
x∈{0,1}n−1
y∈{0,1}m−1
bxy |1x〉 |0y〉+
∑
x∈{0,1}n−1
y∈{0,1}m−1
cxy |1x〉 |1y〉 .
Following our analysis from Appendix D.2, we will study the density matrices
ρ = 3
∑
y
∑
x,x′
bxyb
∗
x′y |1x〉
〈
1x′
∣∣
σ =
3
2

∑
y
∑
x,x′
axya
∗
x′y |0x〉
〈
0x′
∣∣+ axyc∗1x′1y |0x〉 〈1x′∣∣+ cxya∗x′y |1x〉 〈0x′∣∣
+ cxyc
∗
x′y |1x〉
〈
1x′
∣∣ )
where the constants of 3 and 32 come from normalizing the density matrix after we take the conditional
probability.
We now apply Lemma 2 to observe that
3
2
∑
y
∑
x,x′
axyc
∗
x′y |0x〉
〈
1x′
∣∣
must be a matrix of entirely zeroes (corresponding to the top-right block of σ). Therefore, we have
the constraint
∀x, x′ :
∑
y
axyc
∗
x′y = 0.
Furthermore, by comparing the bottom-right blocks of σ and ρ, we have the constraint
∀x, x′ :
∑
y
bxyb
∗
x′y =
∑
y
cxyc
∗
x′y.
We now apply the result analogous to Lemma 2 for the column player. This yields the constraints
∀y, y′ :
∑
x
bxyc
∗
xy′ = 0
∀y, y′ :
∑
x
axya
∗
xy′ =
∑
x
cxyc
∗
xy′ .
Finally, since |ψ〉 implements our desired outcome distribution, we have
∑
x,y
|axy|2 =
∑
x,y
|bxy|2 =
∑
x,y
|cxy|2 = 1
3
.
The state |ψ〉 is a canonical QCE implementation of the desired outcome distribution if and only if
all of the above conditions are satisfied.
We claim that the above set of equations has no solution. Define the matrices A, B, and C, where
Aij = aij , Bij = bij, and Cij = cij . We rewrite the above constraints as:
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Tr(AA†) = Tr(BB†) = Tr(CC†) = 13
AC† = 0
B†C = 0
BB† = CC†
A†A = C†C.
We now compute
(CC†)(CC†) = C(C†C)C† = C(A†A)C† = (CA†)(AC†) = 0.
We claim that the above equation implies that CC† = 0. Indeed, let v be an eigenvector of the
hermitian matrix CC† with eigenvalue λ. We now compute
vT (CC†)(CC†)v = vT (CC†)v · λ = λ2vT v = 0
and thus λ = 0. Since v was an arbitrary eigenvector, we conclude that CC† is the all-zero matrix.
But this contradicts the fact that Tr(CC†) = 1/3.
Therefore, there does not exist a state |ψ〉 satisfying the density matrix conditions of Appendix D.2,
and thus there is no QCE achieving the outcome distribution 13 (TR+BL+BR).
E The Complete Information GHZ Game
To prove Theorems 3 and 5, we use a complete-information version of the GHZ game from [9]. The
standard, incomplete information GHZ game has three players: Alice, Bob, and Charlie. They are
given input bits a, b, and c respectively, with the promise that a + b + c = 0 (mod 2). The players
output bits x, y, and z respectively, and they win if x+ y + z (mod 2) = a ∨ b ∨ c.
It is straightforward to show that no classical strategy allows the three players to win with cer-
tainty. However, if they share an entangled state, then they can always win. In particular, suppose
that they share the state
|ψGHZ〉 = 1
2
(|000〉 − |011〉 − |101〉 − |110〉),
where the first bit belongs to Alice, the second bit to Bob, and the third bit to Charlie. It is
easy to check that the players always win if they all use the quantum protocol “Apply a Hadamard
transformation to your qubit if and only if your input bit is 1. Then measure your qubit in the
standard basis and play the result.”
We now consider a “complete information GHZ game” (denoted cGHZ) which has four players:
Alice, Bob, Charlie, and Nate. In the cGHZ game, Nate moves first, and has four possible moves
(corresponding to each assignment of bits a, b, and c such that a + b + c = 0 mod 2.) Alice, Bob,
and Charlie then move in turn, where each of these players can only distinguish between information
sets based on their own input bit value. Each of these players has two possible moves (corresponding
to the value they choose for their output bit) and we give each of Alice, Bob, and Charlie payoff 1
if their moves correspond to a winning outcome of the GHZ game, and payoff 0 otherwise. We give
Nate a payoff equal to 1 minus Alice’s payoff.
It is clear that there is no EFCE or IR-EFCE in which Alice, Bob, and Charlie have expected utility
1. (In particular, Nate can always guarantee himself non-zero expected utility by mixing randomly
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between his four actions.) In both of these equilibrium concepts, the advice at each information set is
determined before the game begins, and for any fixed set of advice, Nate could get non-zero expected
utility by mixing.
However, consider the QCE in which Alice, Bob, and Charlie share the state |ψGHZ〉 as before
(where Nate holds none of the qubits from |ψGHZ〉), where Nate mixes uniformly between his 4
actions, and where the other three players act according to the winning strategy of the GHZ game.
It is clear that this is a QCE: Nate cannot improve his utility by deviating, since Alice, Bob, and
Charlie win regardless of Nate’s move. The other three players have no incentive to deviate, since
their expected utility of 1 is maximal. Since the outcome distribution of this QCE has expected
utility 1 for Alice, Bob, and Charlie, there is no EFCE or IR-EFCE achieving this distribution. This
completes the proof of Theorem 3.
F Proof of Theorem 5
We will now prove Theorem 5 by showing an extensive form game G and outcome distribution D
which can be achieved by a QCE and by an EFCE but not by any IR-EFCE. The game G is a
five-player game combining aspects of the cGHZ game with the game from Figure 3. We construct
this game by beginning with the structure from Figure 3, and leave the IN branch unchanged. (We
give players 3, 4, and 5 payoffs of 0 in the outcomes (IN, a, L), (IN, a,R), (IN, b, L), and (IN, b,R).)
In the OUT branch, however, instead of having payoff (3, 3), we have a version of cGHZ game, where
player 1 takes the role of Nate and players 3, 4, and 5 have the roles of Alice, Bob, and Charlie.
(Player 2 gets no moves in this branch of the tree, and receives payoff 0 in all of the outcomes.) In
this version of the cGHZ game, players 3, 4, and 5 get payoff 1 if they succeed and player 1 gets payoff
0. If players 3, 4, and 5 fail in the cGHZ game, then they get 0 payoff while player 1 gets payoff 50.
Consider the outcome distribution D = 1/2(IN, a, L) + 1/2(IN, b,R). I claim that D can be
achieved by a QCE and by an EFCE but not by any IR-EFCE. First, we’ll show that there is a
QCE with outcome distribution D. Consider the QCE where players 3, 4, and 5 share the entangled
state |ψGHZ〉 (and they are instructed to use the appropriate circuits from the GHZ protocol) and
players 1 and 2 share the state 1√
2
(|0〉 |0〉+ |1〉 |1〉). We instruct player 1 to play IN , and then in his
next information set to measure his qubit in the standard basis. Player 2 is instructed (if he has the
opportunity to move) to measure his qubit in the standard basis and to play the corresponding move.
If everyone follows their prescribed protocol, then it is clear that the resulting outcome distribution
is indeed D. I now claim that no player can benefit by deviating. In particular, players 3, 4, and
5 never have the opportunity to move (since player 1 is playing IN) and thus have no incentive to
deviate. Player 1 realizes that, if he were to play OUT instead of IN , that he would receive payoff 0
(since players 3, 4, and 5 will always win the cGHZ game), and thus he will indeed play IN . Once he
plays IN , it is in his interest for his next action to coordinate with player 2. Similarly, it is obvious
that player 2 has no incentive to deviate.
Furthermore, it is clear that D can be achieved by an EFCE. The key point is that player 1’s
expected utility of following his advice and playing IN in his first information set is 51, while he can
never get utility more than 50 by playing OUT . The remainder of the argument is analogous to the
argument above.
We finally claim that there is no IR-EFCE achieving distribution D. The reason is that player
1 can obtain expected utility at least 504 > 2 by playing IN and then mixing randomly between his
four available actions in the cGHZ game. Therefore, if he sees that his later advice will be R, he can
improve his utility immediately by deviating and playing OUT .
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